We’ve setup our CI build process to use docker for consistent, cross-platform builds. To ensure that our builds don’t use a malicious docker image (because the surface area of attack with TLS is enormous if you’re using X.509), we’ve been using DCT (Docker Content Trust).

Unfortunately, I just discovered that the official docker documentation says that DCT is being deprecated. Apparently this was announced last year, and in June this blog post was published with advice:

• https://www.docker.com/blog/docker-content-trust-retirement-and-migration-guidance/

Cosign is not secure

We spent some time looking into cosign, but we discovered that the private keys aren't actually in the hands of the developer.

Rather, they use this complicated setup using very insecure X.509 to issue temporary certificates.

The result is that the OIDC identity provider (e.g., GitHub) extends the vector of attack significantly -- to probably tens of thousands of people -- that can publish a malicious image that will be accepted by cosign as "trusted"

Notation (Notary v2)

I also looked at Notation (aka “Notary v2”), but there’s no way to bootstrap the software safely, since (perplexingly) their tool for verifying the authenticity of images using cryptographic signatures itself can’t be verified using a cryptographic signature.

Alternatives

Are there any other alternatives that I can use to replace DCT to ensure the authenticity (using cryptography) of the container images that I download -- where the keys are actually held by the developer (thus significantly reducing the "insider threat" risk)?

What do you (or does your org do) to ensure that you’re not using maliciously-modified containers after pulling a new docker image?